Flawed Drafting: Interpreting Planning Permissions

“What are words worth? Words

Words of nuance, words of skill”

Some of the most difficult cases in every area of law arise from flawed drafting and drafting which does not adequately anticipate future eventualities. 
I will leave for another blog post the issues that arise in relation to the drafting and interpretation of section 106 agreements and undertakings, although the Secretary of State’s 12 September 2017 decision letter dismissing an appeal for planning permission for 705 dwellings at King George’s Gate, Surbiton was a salutary lesson, and essential reading, for every planning lawyer.
In the light of Lang J’s judgment this month in London Borough of Lambeth v Secretary of State, this blog post limits itself to the question as how literally should planning permissions be interpreted? Is the planning permission in fact wider in its scope than the local authority intended when granting it? Have restrictions that were initially imposed fallen away by virtue of not being reapplied to subsequent permissions for the permitted buildings or to a permission for amendments to that initial permission? 

There have been many examples where the courts have determined that the legal effect of a permission was not what the authority may have intended, applying what might be regarded as a classically pure planning law approach:

– where a planning permission is clear, unambiguous and valid on its face, regard may only be had to the planning permission itself, including the conditions imposed upon it and the reasons given for the imposition of those conditions 
– an extreme reluctance to imply extra wording into conditions (Widgery LJ’s statement in Trustees of Walton Charities v. Walton & Weybridge DC (1970): “I have never heard of an implied condition in a planning permission and I believe no such creature exists. Planning permission… is not simply a matter of contract between the parties. There is no place…within the law relating to planning permission for an implied condition. Conditions should be expressed, they should be clear, they should be in the document containing the permission.”)

– applying the judge-made principle of a “new chapter in the planning history” of a site, effectively wiping the slate clean of previous planning condition restrictions where a significant change of use or other development has occurred.

This has led over the years to many outcomes which, whilst logical on a dispassionate reading of the relevant document by a lawyer, were certainly not anticipated by the unfortunate planning officer. For instance:
– in Carpet Décor (Guilford) Limited v Secretary of State (Sir Douglas Frank QC, 17 July 1981) a condition “that no variations from the deposited plans and particulars will be permitted unless previously authorised” by the local planning authority was held not to be sufficiently unequivocal as to exclude the operation of the Use Classes Order. 
– in Dunoon Developments Limited v Secretary of State (Court of Appeal, 18 February 1992) a condition on a planning permission for a car showroom that stated that the use of the premises would be limited to the display, sale and storage of cars was not sufficient to exclude the operation of the General Permitted Development Order.
– in I’m Your Man Limited v Secretary of State (Robin Purchas QC, 4 September 1998) it was held that for a planning permission to be construed as limited to a temporary period, it was not sufficient for the restriction to be set out in the description of development rather than in a condition. 
– in Stevenage Borough Council v Secretary of State (HHJ Waksman QC, 3 June 2010) the owner of a retail park was held to be free of various restrictions on the types of goods which could be sold, by virtue of planning permissions having been granted for subdivision of units and other alterations, which did not reimpose restrictions from the original permission. As with a number of similar cases and CLOPUD appeal decision letters, the ruling partly relied on a liberal application of section 75(3) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, which provides that where the proposed use of a building (or part of) a building is not specified in a permission for its erection (or alterations), “the permission shall be construed as including permission to use the building for the purpose for which it is designed“.
– in Prudential Assurance v Sunderland City Council (Wyn Williams J, 15 July 2010) the High Court held that, through the windfall of a local planning authority’s mistake faced with successive planning applications, Peel Holdings had become free of section 106 restrictions on the types of goods that could be sold from its retail park in Washington, Sunderland. 
The tide then started to turn with the Court of Appeal in Peel Land and Property Investments Plc v Hyndburn Borough Council (19 December 2013). Peel, no doubt hoping for an equivalent outcome as achieved in Sunderland, argued that the failure of the local authority, in drafting a permission for works of alteration to retail park units, to reimpose a condition restricting the goods that could be sold, meant that the restriction had been removed. However the court rejected the submissions. The works did not create a new chapter in the planning history of the units and on the facts (with no indication in the application documents that unrestricted retail use was intended) section 75(3) could not be relied upon in the way that was sought. 

The Supreme Court in Trump International Golf Club Scotland Limited v The Scottish Ministers (16 December 2015) then indicated a more nuanced approach to interpretation:

When the court is concerned with the interpretation of words in a condition in a public document such as a section 36 consent, it asks itself what a reasonable reader would understand the words to mean when reading the condition in the context of the other conditions and of the consent as a whole. This is an objective exercise in which the court will have regard to the natural and ordinary meaning of the relevant words, the overall purpose of the consent, any other conditions which cast light on the purpose of the relevant words, and common sense. Whether the court may also look at other documents that are connected with the application for the consent or are referred to in the consent will depend on the circumstances of the case, in particular the wording of the document that it is interpreting. Other documents may be relevant if they are incorporated into the consent by reference … or there is an ambiguity in the consent, which can be resolved, for example, by considering the application for consent.

Interpretation is not the same as the implication of terms. Interpretation of the words of a document is the precursor of implication. It forms the context in which the law may have to imply terms into a document, where the court concludes from its interpretation of the words used in the document that it must have been intended that the document would have a certain effect, although the words to give it that effect are absent” (Lord Hodge)

Against this background it is therefore interesting to see this month another case in which the owner of a retail investment, in this case a Homebase DIY store, has achieved an outcome which was not intended by the local planning authority, and which could have been avoided by competent drafting of the decision notice. In London Borough of Lambeth v Secretary of State (Lang J, 3 October 2017), a planning permission had been granted varying conditions attached to an earlier permission. The purported effect of the widened conditions was set out in the description of development on the face of the permission:

” For: Variation of condition 1 (Retail Use) of Planning Permission Ref: 10/01143/FUL (Variation of Condition 6 (Permitted retail goods) of planning permission Ref. 83/01916 (Erection of a DIY retail unit for Texas homecare and an industrial building for cow industrial polymers) granted on 17.09.85 to allow for the sale of a wider range of goods to include DIY home and garden improvements, car maintenance, building materials and builders merchants goods, carpets and floor coverings, furniture, furnishings, electrical goods, automobile products, camping equipment, cycles, pet and pet products, office supplies and for no other purpose in Class A1 of the Schedule to the Town and Country Planning (Use Classes) Order 1987 (as amended) Granted on 30.06.2010.


Original Wording:
 The retail use hereby permitted shall be used for the retailing of DIY home and garden improvements and car maintenance, building materials and builders merchants goods, carpets and floor coverings, furniture, furnishings, electrical goods, automobile products, camping equipment, cycles, pet and pet products, office supplies and for no other purpose (including the retail sale of food and drink or any other purpose in Class A1 of the Schedule to the Town and Country Planning (Use Classes) Order 1987 (as amended) or in any provision equivalent to that Class in any statutory instrument revoking and re-enacting that Order. 


Proposed Wording:
 The retail unit hereby permitted shall be used for the sale and display of non-food goods only and, notwithstanding the provisions of the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) Order 1995 (or any Order revoking or re-enacting that Order with or without modification), for no other goods.”

However, for some reason, whoever drafted the permission did not bother to go on and include the proposed wording as a condition. Lang J applied I’m Your Man and held that the purported restriction was of no effect. Lambeth Council’s “intended purpose was not given legal effect by the wording of the 2014 permission, because of flawed drafting.
As set out in Landmark Chambers’ helpful summary , Lang J has granted permission for the case now to go to the Court of Appeal:
I do not accept the Claimant’s critique of my judgment, and the application of the current law to the facts of this case. However, I am left with some unease about the result.  The principle established in I’m Your Man Limited v Secretary of State for the Environment 77 P & CR 251, and its application, merits consideration in a higher court which is not bound by precedent in the same way as the High Court. The interpretation and application of the judgments of the Supreme Court in Trump International Golf Club Scotland Ltd & Anor. v The Scottish Ministers [2015] UKSC 74, [2016] 1 WLR 85 is still evolving, and merit consideration by the Court of Appeal in this case.”

It is worth noting two post-Trump cases where the Court of Appeal has rejected submissions that a narrow interpretation should be given to specific conditions.
First, R (XPL Limited) v Harlow Council (Court of Appeal, 13 April 2016), where a condition preventing “repairs or maintenance of vehicles or other industrial or commercial activities (other than the parking of coaches and other vehicles …” outside specified hours at a coach depot was held to extend to a prohibition on the running of engines. 

Secondly, Dunnett Investments Limited v Secretary of State (Court of Appeal, 29 March 2017) where the court had to determine whether the following condition is to be interpreted as excluding the operation of the General Permitted Development Order so as to allow change of use from offices to residential by way of the prior approval process:

“This use of this building shall be for purposes falling within Class B1 (Business) as defined in the Town and Country Planning (Use Classes) Order 1987, and for no other purpose whatsoever, without express planning consent from the Local Planning Authority first being obtained“.

Did prior approval from the local planning authority pursuant to the GPDO amount to “express planning consent” for the purposes of the condition?
The Court of Appeal reviewed the case law on interpretation of conditions:
In relation to the interpretation of, specifically, a planning condition which is said to exclude the operation of the GPDO, other authorities are of some assistance. From them, the following themes can be discerned.


i) It is rightly common ground that a planning condition on a planning consent can exclude the application of the GPDO (see Dunoon Developments v Secretary of State for the Environment and Poole Borough Council (1993) 65 P&CR 101 (“Dunoon Developments”)).


ii) Exclusion may be express or implied. However, because a grant of planning permission for a stated use is a grant of permission for only that use, a grant for a particular use cannot in itself exclude the application of the GPDO. To do that, something more is required (see, e.g., Dunoon Developments at [107] per Sir Donald Nicholls VC). 


iii) In Carpet Décor (Guilford) Limited v Secretary of State for the Environment (1981) 261 EG 56, Sir Douglas Frank QC sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge said that, because in the absence of such a condition the GPDO has effect by operation of law, the condition should be in “unequivocal terms”. Although “unequivocal” was used by Mr Katkowski in his written argument, during the course of debate he accepted that that term was now less appropriate, given the modern trend away from myopic focus upon the words without proper reference to their full context. However, he submitted (and I accept) that, to exclude the application of the GPDO, the words used in the relevant condition, taken in their full context, must clearly evince an intention on the part of the local planning authority to make such an exclusion.”

The court did not accept the claimant’s arguments:
The first part of the condition sets out the scope of the permission. I respectfully agree with Patterson J (at [60]), the second part (“…and for no other purpose whatsoever…”) is not, as Mr Katkowski would have it, merely emphatic of the scope of the planning permission, but is rather a clear and specific exclusion of GPDO rights. Whilst, as I have described, each case depends upon its own facts, it is noteworthy that, in Dunoon Developments (at pages 105-6), in finding that the words “limited to” a particular purpose did not exclude GPDO rights, Farquharson LJ compared that phrase with “… and for no other purpose…” as considered in the earlier case of The City of London Corporation v Secretary of State for the Environment (1971) 23 P&CR 169, which he considered was far more emphatic and (he suggested) possibly sufficient to exclude the operation of the GPDO. In this case, we have a more emphatic phrase still, namely “… and for no other purpose whatsoever…”. Further, although we are concerned with rights under the GPDO and not the UCO, the interpretation of that phrase to exclude the operation of the GPDO is at least consistent with R (Royal London Mutual Insurance Society) v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government[2013] EWHC 3597 (Admin); [2014] JPL 458, in which Patterson J held that a condition which restricted use to “only” particular uses within Use Class A1 excluded the right to use the land for other Class A1 uses, because it effectively evinced an intention to identify acceptable uses within the class whilst prohibiting other unacceptable uses within that class unless and until the merits of such use had been tested by the planning authority upon an application for planning permission (see also The Rugby Football Union v The Secretary of state for Local Government, Transport and the Regions [2001] EWHC Admin 927; [2002] JPL 740, in which Ouseley J, at [56], found that the words “for no other use” had similar effect, on the basis that such words “have no other sensibly discernible purpose than to prevent some other use which might otherwise be permissible without planning permission”). The third part of the condition before this court makes it the more abundantly clear that automatic or direct GPDO rights are excluded, by requiring a planning application if such uses are to be pursued.”
Furthermore, “”express planning consent from the Local Planning Authority” cannot sensibly include planning permission granted by the Secretary of State through the GPDO. It means what it says, i.e. planning permission granted by the local planning authority.”
What are the odds on Lang J’s judgment in Lambeth surviving the Court of Appeal?
In the meantime, and possibly whatever the outcome of that case, there is unpredictability. This is particularly unhelpful given the pressures on local planning authorities to issue permissions without unnecessary delay, and without the resources for a lawyer to check what may often on their face appear to be approvals of minor revisions and alterations. Mistakes happen. The extreme reluctance of authorities to issue revocation or modification orders to put mistakes right, a reluctance born of the liability to pay compensation that thereby arises, is another story – and in my view a large part of the problem. 
Simon Ricketts, 14.10.17
Personal views, et cetera

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Class Distinctions 2: Student Housing

Happy freshers’ week. 
I blogged recently about how the planning system struggles when it comes to housing for older people. But there are worse problems when it comes to student housing. Some recent press articles are at the end of this post, but first you need to get through some law I’m afraid (there may be an examination on it later). 
For a start, from a legal perspective there is a similarly poor fit with the Use Classes Order.
Shared student living in converted houses has since 2010 (in England, 2016 in Wales) been hived off from use class C3 (residential use) into use class C4, the HMO (“houses in multiple occupation”) use class: “small shared houses occupied by between three and six unrelated individuals, as their only or main residence, who share basic amenities such as a kitchen or bathroom”.
This definition excludes: 
– HMOs in blocks of flats (eg what seems to be the main model these days in relation to purpose built student accommodation blocks, with clusters of self-contained flats, each housing six students, sharing cooking and living accommodation) 

– Houses shared by more than six students.

The background to the creation of C4, which was not all about students, but in part a response to concerns about pressures being caused to communities by high concentrations of HMOs more generally, is well summarised in a House of Commons library briefing paper, Houses in multiple occupation & planning restrictions (14 July 2017). 
By virtue of Part L of the Town & Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) Order 2015, unless the relevant local planning authority has made an article 4 direction to contrary effect, planning permission isn’t needed to change from C4 to C3 (residential use), or vice versa. Many university towns and cities have made article 4 directions, requiring planning permission to change from C3 to C4 use, for example Sheffield, Leeds, Loughborough, Leicester, Nottingham, Southampton and Durham to name but a few. 
Against the background of almost universal university expansion, this constraint on supply of converted accommodation, denying much of the already (in most areas at least) expensive PRS market to students, has surely played its part both in further increasing student housing costs and in giving students fewer practical alternatives to living in purpose-built student accommodation, often now built and operated by large specialist student housing providers. 
As far as the planning system is concerned, purpose built student housing blocks are generally treated as “sui generis” (outside any use class) and therefore specific planning policies are required at an individual local planning authority level to control them (or to impose standards in terms of unit size, daylighting and sound insulation). In some ways they now often more closely resemble clusters (stacked high) of quasi C4 HMO style accommodation, with bedrooms in self-contained clusters of six, each with its own kitchen and communal area. 
Planning permission is required to make a material change from a sui generis use. Whether there is a material change in the character of the use is for the decision maker to judge. As long as conditions or section 106 agreement planning obligations aren’t breached, change to, say, co-living may not require planning permission. 
Ensuring that purpose built student accommodation is affordable is a big issue. In recent years we have seen student rent strikes, supported by the NUS. In London, we wait to see what further controls will be proposed in the draft London Plan, now expected on 29 November. In the meantime, there was nothing in the Mayor’s draft housing strategy published on 6 September 2017 (in 236 pages I could only find one passing reference to students). To what extent will the policies set out in the previous Mayor’s March 2016 housing SPG remain? The SPG takes the following approach in relation to purpose built student accommodation (PBSA):

– “providers of PBSA are encouraged to develop models for delivery of PBSA in london which minimise rental costs, via its layout and location, for the majority of the bedrooms in the development and bring these rates nearer to the rate of a affordable student accommodation described below
– requirement for affordable student accommodation where a proposed provider does not have an undertaking with a specified academic institution(s) that specifies that the accommodation will be occupied by students of that institution(s)

– affordability determined by reference to a formula that equates to 55% of average student income. For the academic year 2016/2017 this equated to £5,886 or less and for a 38 week contract a weekly rent of £155. 

– the extent of affordable housing to be secured “should be the maximum reasonable amount subject to viability” (our old friend!)

– to enable PBSA providers to maximise the delivery of affordable student accommodation by increasing the profitability of the development, boroughs should consider allowing the temporary use of accommodation during vacation periods for ancillary uses and should consider setting nil CIL rates for affordable student accommodation. 

– eligibility for affordable student accommodation should be based on assessment of need. 

Now that reading list:

Oliver Wainwright, A new urban eyesore: Britain’s shamefully shoddy student housing (The Guardian, 11 September 2017)

Rhiannon Bury, Student housing may be a property bubble in waiting (Telegraph, 18 September 2017)

Could it be the end of the Newcastle student flat boom? Council set to vote on greater controls (Evening Chronicle? 15 January 2017)

Letter: Students vs Residents – this situation in Bath around housing is not students’ fault (Bath Chronicle, 5 September 2017)

Students in Wales taking out loans to afford ‘luxury’ flats (BBC website, 22 September 2017)

It seems to me that there are various issues to be unpacked here:
– the need for authorities properly to plan for the consequences of increases in student numbers

– competing needs as between between student and general needs housing

– often unjustified “there goes the neighbourhood” concerns about the impacts of students on an area. 

– affordability

– the extent to which universities should retain responsibility for housing their students, affordably and to appropriate quality standards.

Class, discuss. 
Simon Ricketts, 24.9.17
Personal views, et cetera

Class Distinctions: Planning For Older People

Housing is needed by people of all ages but there is a particular need for specialist housing for the elderly. A research report, Housing our Ageing Population: Learning from Councils meeting the Housing Need of our Ageing Population was published by the Local Government Association on 8 September 2017. From its executive summary:
“The number of people aged over 65 is forecast to rise over the next decade, from the current 11.7 million people, to 14.3 million by 2025, a 22 per cent rise. This means that one in five of the total population will be over 65 in 10 years’ time, which will become one in four by 2050. 

In the UK, the vast majority of over 65s currently live in the mainstream housing market. Only 0.6 per cent of over 65s live in housing with care, which is 10 times less than in more mature retirement housing markets such as the USA and Australia, where over 5 per cent of over 65s live in housing with care. The suitability of the housing stock is of critical importance to the health of individuals and also impacts on the demand for public spending, particularly social care and the NHS.
Making quality options available also helps with “right-sizing”, freeing up larger under-used homes back into the housing stock. 
Not only is there great need but changes to local government funding are afoot which are going to increase the pressure for supported housing for the elderly. From the LGA report:
Funding for Supported Housing: Consultation contains the key elements of the Government’s proposals for the future funding of supported housing from April 2019 including: 

“Councils will have responsibility for funding, commissioning and quality assuring all supported housing in their areas from April 2019.

“These proposals would in effect bring to an end the current housing benefit arrangements for all specialist older people’s housing at the end of March 2019“. 

We can expect policies on housing for the elderly in the forthcoming London Plan. The Mayor of London says as much in his draft Housing Strategy, published on 5 September 2017: One of his objectives is “increasing opportunities for older homeowners to move to accommodation more suitable for their needs, including benchmarks for older people’s housing requirements in the draft London Plan” (part of policy 5.2). 
I was also pleased to see a section on planning for older people in the DCLG consultation paper, Planning for the right homes in the right places (14 September 2017) even if it only amounted to two paragraphs:
“92. Section 8 of the Neighbourhood Planning Act 2017 requires the Secretary of State to provide guidance for local planning authorities as to how they should address the housing needs that result from old age or disability. Helping local planning authorities provide a simple yet robust evidence base for such groups will form part of the guidance, and will allow them to maintain the benefits of a more streamlined approach to calculating the overall housing need. 

93. When developing new planning guidance for older people, it is important that we have a shared understanding of who is included in this group. The definition of older people in Annex 2 of the National Planning Policy Framework reflects a range of people at different ages with different needs from retirement age to the very frail elderly. We are also aware of different types of housing that accommodate such a group – ranging from general market and affordable housing to specialised, purpose-built market and rental accommodation and care homes. Given the importance of planning for the need for older people as our population ages, we are reviewing whether we need to amend the definition of older people for planning purposes. We consider that the current definition is still fit-for-purpose but would welcome views.”
Not only is more housing required, there needs to be much more specificity and definition. Whilst there are more detailed supportive passages in the Planning Practice Guidance, paragraph 50 of the NPPF simply says: 
local planning authorities should: 

    * plan for a mix of housing based on current and future demographic trends, market trends and the needs of different groups in the community (such as, but not limited to, families with children, older people, people with disabilities, service families and people wishing to build their own homes)”

As the consultation paper seems to accept, the definition of “older people” in the glossary to the NPPF is extremely wide:
“People over retirement age, including the active, newly-retired through to the very frail elderly, whose housing needs can encompass accessible, adaptable general needs housing for those looking to downsize from family housing and the full range of retirement and specialised housing for those with support or care needs.”
I’m not sure on what basis the definition can be said to be fit for purpose. Housing for the elderly doesn’t fit neatly into traditional planning law, partly because it is a wide spectrum of operating models, some being a specialist version of use class C3, dwellinghouses, and some being institutional and care based in nature, falling within use class C2. 
Class C2: “Use for the provision of residential accommodation and care to people in need of. care (other than a use within a class C3 (dwelling house). Use as a hospital or nursing home.”
Class C3: “Use as a dwellinghouse (whether or not as a sole or main residence) — (a) by a single person or by people living together as a family, or. (b) by not more than 6 residents living together as a single household (including a household where care is provided for residents).”
 I wrote a blog post last year, Time To Review The “C” Use Classes?. As with other alternative or quasi residential uses, the use class distinction matters because local planning authorities have very different policy approaches in terms of whether the proposal is acceptable in that location and as to the requirements arising, for instance in relation to affordable housing. The distinction can be crucial in relation to the extent of CIL liability and indeed whether planning permission is required in the first place.

The problem is that in reality the distinctions between C2 and C3 are becoming increasingly blurred – there is a spectrum, with no clear dividing line between the two. 
At the C3 end of the spectrum, there is sheltered housing and retirement living operated by the likes of McCarthy and Stone and Churchill Retirement Living. Churchill have produced a useful guide for planning and design professionals, Retirement Living Explained (April 2017). In order to distinguish its retirement living model from general C3 use, Churchill advocates the use of model age restricted planning condition:
“Each of the apartments hereby permitted shall be occupied only by: 

* Persons aged 60 or over; or 


* A spouse/or partner (who is themselves over 55 years old) living as part of a single household with such a person 
or persons; or 


* Persons who were living in one of the apartments as part of a single household with a person or persons aged 60 
or over who has since died; or 


* Any other individual expressly agreed in writing by the Local Planning Authority. ”

Is it right that C3 retirement living should be required to deliver affordable housing when itself it meets a non-mainstream housing need? Pending any reconsideration of that policy, Churchill’s guide includes a template section 106 agreement, suggesting the making of an off-site affordable housing contribution (with early stage review if the development hasn’t started reached shell and core stage within 28 months), given that the affordable housing requirements attaching to general market housing C3 products would be inappropriate. 

At the C2 end of the spectrum, there is a variety of operating models, with a bewildering variety of descriptions, including care homes, continuing care retirement communities, assisted living, very sheltered housing and close care. 
Hardest to categorise is what the market refers to as “extra care”, which has been described as follows: 
“Extra care housing is housing with care primarily for older people where occupants have specific tenure rights to occupy self-contained dwellings and where they have agreements that cover the provision of care, support, domestic, social, community or other services. Unlike people living in residential care homes, extra care residents are not obliged as a rule to obtain their care services from a specific provider, though other services (such as some domestic services, costs for communal areas including a catering kitchen, and in some cases some meals) might be built into the charges residents pay.” (Extra Care Housing What Is It?, paper, 2015, published by Housing LIN). 

So what are the distinguishing factors between C2 and C3?
A September 2017 blog post, Update on recent Extra Care Housing Planning Appeals and CIL Success, by Tetlow King’s John Sneddon, identifies two recent appeal decisions where inspectors agreed that proposed extra care developments would fall within use class C2. (The piece is also useful on the opportunities for ensuring that C2 developments are exempted from CIL within local planning authorities’ CIL charging charging schedules.)

My Town partner Liz Christie has previously carried out an analysis of planning appeal decisions. The most important factors for determining whether the operation is properly to be regarded as C2 or C3 use are (i) the physical layout of the building; (ii) the level of care; and (iii) the nature of the operation of the proposed development. We can go into more detail on each of these aspects, with appeal references, for anyone with a specific interest in the issues but, in summary, the whole area unnecessarily complicated and uncertain. Some standardised definitions and policy expectations would be really helpful.  
I wrote this blog post as a by-product of preparing to speak at LD Events’ 26 September 2017 conference, Alternative Residential Property 2017. See some of you there. 
Simon Ricketts, 16 September 2017
Personal views, et cetera